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1. Introduction 1
A supply chain consists of all activities and information associated with the
transformation flow of goods and services from the raw material stage til the
final product reaches the consumer. Since the transformation of individual
products and services normally involve the interactions of independent firms,
several organisations are typically involved in the supply chain. A key variable
in the organisation of the chain is therefore the level of financial integration
and the contractual obligations between the participating firms. Pending on
the external business environment, the organisation of the supply chain varies
across sectors and between firms in a given sector .
This paper focuses on the organisation of the supply chain in the offshore oil
industry, primarily the relationships between upstream oil-companies and
their main contractors. Upstream oil activities represent one part of a broader
supply chain of fluids, but we wil only look at the extraction and production
phases in this chain. The oil company is thus our final consumer. From studies
of the North Sea offshore industry, we know that the re are dose ties between
the upstream oil industry and its suppliers. The Norwegian state owned oil
company Statoil, for instance, tends to outsource goods and services to
numerous independent suppliers. At the same time, Statoil provides several
incentives and makes alliances with its suppliers in order to reduce life cyde
costs. In new and promising markets in developing countries where technology
and trust may differ from those of the North Sea, the organisation of the
supply chain may differ from the above pattern. If so, we may expect the
internationalisation strategies of these firm to differ from those applied in the
North Sea.
Along the transaction costs traditions, we are particularly interested in how
the organisation of the supply chain depends on the complexity of the
technologyapplied (Wiliamson 1985, Coase 1960). In this analysis, we wil
bring in one new dimension by analysing how cultural aspects such as trust
may influence the organisation of the supply chain (Sako 1992, Baker 1997).
Angola is currently considered the most promising market in the world, and
the increased production wil be from deepwater wells. While subsea and
deepwater constitute approximately one third of the global market for
offshore engineering and construction services in 2000, they wil increase to
nearly 50 per cent or approximately USD 30 bilion in 2004.23
i I would like to thank Hildegunn Nordaas, Line Tøndel, Inge Tvedten, Øystein Kristiansen
and Henri de Groot for helpful comments on this draft. Financial support from the
Norwegian Research Council, 'Petropol' is greatfully appreciated.2 Estimate by Coflexip Stena Offshore. A smaller estimate of USD 20 bilions is provided by
The World Deepwater Report 2000-2004 by Douglas-Westwood Limited (adapted from
Alexander's Gas & Oil Connections Online; http://www.gasandoil.com/goc/companyJ).
According to The World Subsea Report 1999-003 by Douglas-Westwood Limited, subsea
expenditure wil constiute around 50 per cent of deepwater expenditure.
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The Angolan case is important for several reasons. First, it gives information
on the organisation of the supply chain in a new technologically advanced
segment of the oil market, namely deepwater exploration. Second, it sheds
lights on how differences in cultural factors such as trust influences the
structure of the supply chain. Finally, from a more strategic point of view,
Angola represents a growth potential for the Norwegian supply industry and
others. In subsea markets such as the Angolan, the growth potential for the
supply industry is highest. 4
In the following section, we give a brief overview of the oil industry in Angola
and supply chain management in the Norwegian part of the North Sea. While
the structure of the supply chain in the North Sea is presente d in several
publications (Heum 1999; Greve H, Haugland, and Walderhaug 1996;
Nordaas 2000ab), one hardly finds any comprehensive analysis of supply
chains in Angola. Based on transaction costs-inspired theories of supply chain
management, section three generates some hypotheses regarding the
organisation of the supply chain in Angola. By presenting two case studies,
section four analyses this supply chain, particularly in terms of contracts
awarded, ownership structure and informal network between the parties. The
two case studies chosen, Kuito and GirassoL, have either recently starte d
production or are in the process of doing so. The main question addressed is
whether technological and cultural differences may explain how and why
these supply chains differ from the present North Sea structures. The
conduding section emphasises the way in which the organisation of the supply
chain influences main strategies for penetrating this type of market.
3 West Africa is the most promising area in this field, and the expenditure on subsea driling
and completion wil exceed that in North America (including Gulf of Mexico) in 2002. Cf.
The World Deepwater Report 2000-004. Douglas-Westwood Limited (adapted from
Alexander's Gas & Oil Connections). According to Dick Matzke, vice chairman of Chevron,
Angola is "one of the worlds best areas for frontier oil exploration and production, especially
in deep water areas. " Press release from Chevron lanuary 5 2000.
4 Moreover, since deepwater activities are extremely skil-intensive, one should expect a high
profit margin.
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2. Sul! chains in the oil industry
This section gives a general overview of the types of agents involved in the
supply chain in the oil industry, their core activities and mark et segments. It
st arts with an overview of the oil industry in Angola and its growth potential.
Supply chain management in the oil industry is the n described with an
emphasis on the role played by human and physical assets. As a benchmark
for the subsequent analysis, an overview of supply chain management in the
Norwegian part of the North Sea is presented. Section 2.3 demonstrates how
creating partnerships plays a signifcant role in this market.
2.1. The oil industry in Angola
Angola starte d oil production already in 1957. Oil plays a significant role in
the Angolan economy. Oil production constitutes 50 per cent of GOP and
revenue from oil production constitutes half of Angolan tax income. In 1999,
a Chevron-led consortium produced 420,000 bpd oil, or 58 per cent of the
Angolan production of 720,000 bpd. Other companies, Elf, Texaco, Fina,
Ranger, and the Angolan state oil company Sonangol, produced the rest. With
the start -up of the Kuito Field, Chevron 's total production per day has
increased to 550,000 bpd.5
Since 1995, oil majors have starte d to encounter huge oil reservoirs in
Angola's deep water, from depths of 300 meters to beyond 1200 meters.
Reserves have been in proportions far exceeding anything onshore. In half a
decade, some eight bn barrels have been discovered. Jf three-quarters of these
are proven, Angola's reserves wil more than double.6 Since Girassol was
discovered, ten other fields have been found in Elf's successful Block 17. Esso
has made huge discoveries in various fields (nine founds) in block 15 and
Chevron has made a num be r of signifcant discoveries in block 14.1 All new
fields are based on production sharing agreements (PSA) with Sonangol.
Angolan authorities expect yearly investments in the oil sector to be
approximately four bilions USO (www.angola.com ). Chevron and its
partners alone plan to invest some six bilion dollars in Angola over the next
five years. In fact, Norwegian oil companies are poised to spend three bilion
dollars on offshore oil exploration in Angola during the next decade.8 Angola
therefore represents a growth potential for the supply industry.
5 Press release from Chevron Oct. 4, 2000.
6 Alexander's Gas & OiL.
1 One of the reasons why these new discoveries have yet not be 
en developed is that while the
operators are seeking to develop different fields in concert Sonangol has put its foot down.
For instance, as of November 2000 a dispute is ongoing between ExxonMobile and Sonangol
regarding tenders for Kizomba field where Sonangol is seeking to reduce the speed of the
process.
Information from the Norwegian Ambassador Bjørg Leite (quoted in Alexander's Gas and
Oil.
3
CM I
About 200 firms are registered in Angola, providing services and goods to the
oil industry. There is no available information about the number of employees
and turn over of the se firms. Less than 20 per cent are Angolan companies and
most of these has some relationship to Sonangol. The rest are local offshoots
of multinationals put in place to service the Angolan market. Angola is not
being used as a stepping stone to service other markets in Nigeria, Chad etc.
Sonangol plays the leading role in the oil industry both as a concessionaire, a
licence partner, a partner in the supply of goods and services and as a
regulator and implementing agency of Angolan oil policy.
Several Norwegian companies are already established in Angola (e.g., Statoil,
Norsk Hydro, Kvaerner, Stolt Offshore and Kongsberg Offshore), but as
indicated above, the growth prospects makes Angola an even more interesting
market in the future.
2.2. Market segment and supply chain
A firm which seeks to penetrate a new market needs first of all to clarify its
core activities and which market it wants to compete in. Regarding upstream
oil production, there are a number of different tasks or segments. Firms can be
classified according to the task or market segments they work in.g Some firms
specialise in a single task while others provide all or a combination. Firms
specialising in more than one task are integrating or bundling its activities.
Bundling means that the firm seeks to be an integrated provider of fluids (oil
or gas). Table 1 classifies tasks or markets in the upstream oil sector.
Hallburton is an example of a vertical multinational which has integrated all
of the tasks liste d in Table 1 (and is involved in downstream activities also).
Halliburton can therefore serve as an example of a integrated oil service firm.
The other extreme is a firm specialising in a single tas k (for instance in
driling) . Normally the supply industry (the oil service firms) is dealing with
tasks 1-5 in Table 1, while the core activity of the oil company is the
production of oil (task 6 in table 1).
As with the oil majors, the supply industry consists of multinationals and we
see a ris ing trend in acquisitions, particularly in terms of vertical activities.
Table 1: Key Tasks in the Upstream Oil Sector
1. Exploration (including seismic) and driling (which in deepwater is
undertaken by ships or SP AR platforms) ,
2. Engineering and project management,
3. Construction of production facilities e.g., platform,
4. Subsea construction, pipelayand fabrication of subsea equipment,
5. Installation (platform and subsea),
6. Operations (production of oil). 10
9 One may als 
o classify markets geographically.10 There is also a separate market of well maintenance. The importance of this market
increases during the on stream phase.
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The key determining facto r in the choice of market, is the assets of the firm,
particularly its knowledge and capabilities. We distinguish between human
and physical assets. There are two types of human assets, individual and firm-
specifc knowledge. A firm may acquire physical assets and firm-specifc
knowledge; individual knowledge, however, belongs to the individuals.
A particular aspect of the supply chain in the oil industry is the role played by
producer services. Producer services such as research and development (R&O)
and engineering act as intermediate goods at every step in the supply chain
and play a signifcant role in the co-ordination of the whole process from field
exploration to shipment of crude oil. In the deepwater sector, there are three
types of know-how (engineering competence) of particular relevance: the
engineering of a platform, the engineering of flowlines and sub-sea equipment
and reservoir management and well design.
Effcient information flows between the agents involved in the different tasks
are particularly important in the oil industry. The integration of tasks can
increase the information flow between firms and thereby reduce the
trans action costs in the supply chain. Oil companies prefer increasingly to deal
with a limited number of suppliers, a factor which give additional supports to
the integration of tasks. The other side of the coin is that integration may lead
to ineffciencies. Normally, there is a trade off between specialisation and
in tegration; integration reduces the trans action costs of us ing the market at the
costs of scale economies and specialisation. Supply chain management deals
with mechanisms for solving this trade-off.
The supply chain is mainly characterised by two physical assets: the
production facilties (e.g., platform) and the fluid and reservoir characteristics
(e.g., the oil); and one human asset, namely knowledge (producing engineering
services). All assets are essential in order to produce oiL.
In addition to the assets of the firm, the market potential in the different
segments is als o an important factor in the choice of market. In addition to
engineering, platforms (3, 3 refers to phase 3 in table 1), subsea eq uipmen t,
driling and well completion (1), (4) and (5) are the three markets which
dominate deepwater expenditure.
The supply industry not only needs to decide which market segment in the
supply chain it wil penetrate, firms also need to assess how they wil serve the
market: through exports or investments? In order for multinationals to
undertake FDI, three conditions need to be met (Dunning 1981): ownership
advantage; internalisation advantage; and locational advantage.
The firm's ownership advantage refers to a situation where it has a product,
technology or intangible assets (human capital) of such a nature that the firm
enjoys some advantage in foreign markets to compensate for the disadvantages
of entering new markets. Internalisation advantage relates to the fact that the
firm must have a reason to exploit its ownership advantage internally, rather
5
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than licence or sell its product/process to a foreign firm. Firms transfer
knowledge internally in order to maintain the value of assets and prevent asset
dissipation. When products are new, complex and have no prior commercial
application, and are produced by R&O intensive firms, transfers tend to be
internal (see (Markusen, Rutherford, and Hunter 1995) for an overview of the
literature). As far as locational advantage is concerned, the firm must have a
reason to locate production abroad rather than concentrate it in the home
country, especially when there are scale economies at the plant level.
In Angola, local infrastructure is missing and the fact that oil companies make
most of their important logistic decisions from their headquarters in Paris or
Houston (confer section four) , indicate that it is a locational disadvantage for
the supply industry of locating in Angola. However, saying this, to the extent
that local investments have been undertaken by the multinationals, they have
played an important role in terms of being awarded contracts.
From the operator's point ofview, the re are different ways of organ ising the
supply chain. Two extremes are the vertical integrated supply chain, in which
all tasks are undertaken by one firm, and market transactions based on arm i s
length trade. There are also hybrid institutions (see the following section).
2.3. Forming partnerships. a hybrid example of
integrated supply chain management
Since downstream competition is fierce, an oil company may increase its
profits either by increasing the scale of its downstream production (to achieve
economics of scale), differentiating its downstream products (through
branding) or undertaking lifecycling cost savings in its upstream activities.
Regarding the last option, the most important criteria are the success rate in
exploration and the reduction in development or on-stream costs.
Since the oil companies ten d to outsource or procure a substantial part of its
goods and service from independent firms specialising in one or more of the
tasks described in Table 1, they therefore need to provide the supply industry
with incentives towards cost-reduction.
Procurement of goods and services constitutes more than 50 per cent of an oil
company's cost. llFor the oil company, this means that a considerable part of
its gross output is created outside the company. Since even a small change in
the organisation of the supply chain may lead to a significant change in profits
for the oil company, providing the supply industry with incentives for cost
reduction is important. Forming partnerships with prequalified suppliers is
one mechanism for improving these incentives that is commonly applied in the
Norwegian part of the North Sea. Forming partnerships based on interaction
and mutuality with suppliers is a central Statoil strategy, and indicates that
11 . Procurement of goods and services in i 996 constiuted nearly three times as much as
Statoil's profit before tax (www.statoil.com).
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Statoil plays an important role in the organisation of the supply chain in the
North Sea.12
According to Statoils Director Trondslien (www.statoil.com), supply chain
development in the oil industry is characterised by a focus on maximising the
chain's jointprofit. He is also conceptualising the competition arena as
between 'integrated chains '(where a company is only one of many links in a
supply chain) - not between disintegrated chains consisting of individual
firms. It is no surprise that a downstream firm tries to give the impression
that all firms in the chain have similar interests, although it has been diffcult
to find other oil companies emphasising this as clearly as Statoil, at least in
Angola.13 As we wil return to in section 4, competition rather seem to be
between integrated oil service firms (excluding the oil company) .
Figure 1: Development trends through integrated supp'Y chain management
SUPPLY CHAIN
MANAGEMENT
ÒOAL
. FOCUS
IINE(fAT£01=
CU$1omiN SMlìllIon
S1rWgle
Systems.
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INFORMATION SHARlNG ..~
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Source: Adapted from Trondslien, P. The Importance of the Procurement Process to Statoil,
and the Development within Statoils Supply Chain. www. Statoil com.
The importance of creating partnerships (or relationships) is also underscored
by other characteristics of procurement:
. The need for adjustment and bargaining. Parties need to bargain during the
contract process because contracts are incomplete. Ex ante uncertainty
related to technical specification leads the oil company in many cases to
specify functional requirements to a product or technology. This gives the
12 (Anna Duboi, statoil com) distinguishes between a unilateral perspective and a bilateral
Berspective on partnerships.3 When deciding on contract partners, Shell seeks mutually beneficial relationships with their
contractors. BP Amoco published a new "Supply Chain Management" philosophy in 1999
placing more emphasis on the supply chain management process in order to reduce costs and
improve access to technology. We have not found similar explicit references to the importance
of creation of relationships in the chain on the homepages of the other majors.
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contractor some degree of flexibilty in order to develop a particular piece
of goods or services. At the same time, unforeseen contingencies frequently
arise. Each parties' appraisal of such contingencies may differ, and, since
contracts are incomplete, bargaining represents one way of solving such
disputes.
. Technical solutions are specifc to particular fields (depth and size) and
may be tailored towards specific oil companies. Intermediate goods and
services are therefore differentiated, and innovations are important in
order to satisfy specific demands from the oil companies.
. Limited numbers of pre-qualified suppliers for the main contracts. At the
same time, numerous contracts are awarded, implying that the oil
company cannot create a relationship to all its suppliers (e.g., in the
Gullfaks field in the North Sea more than 1,700 contracts were awarded
(Nordaas 2000a).
Trondslien does not assess the supply chain in upstream oil market from the
perspective of financial integration. By this measure, the chain, at least in the
North Sea, is rather fragmented. The most commonway of organ ising the
supply chain in the North Sea is that of the independent and integrated
sup pli er (contractor) that under takes engineering (designing the platform),
procurement, construction (build the platform), and installation (EPCI
contract), and delivers the platform to the oil company. However, as the
Gullaks example showed there are a num ber of additional suppliers involved
and the oil company plays an important co-ordination role towards these.
Trondslien tends to look at the supply chain as a business group where the
players create informal partnerships, networks and alliances. In such
networks, long-term relationships, trust and mutual dependenee substitute for
financial integration and lead to an integrated supply chain where the oil
company largely controls the value added outside the company.
2.3.1. NorSak - i/lustrating the role of trust
There are hybrid institutions in-between markets and hierarchies. Business
groups vary not only by degree of ownership, but als o according to authority
structure, trust and solidarity (Granovetter 1995; Feenstra, Huang, and
Hamilton 1996).
Trust is of particular importance when contracts are incomplete, and the
environment is uncertain and under rapid technological change. Trust is
therefore of particular importance in the oil industry, and a keyword in both
the NorSok and the CRINE initiativ es in the Norwegian and British parts of
the North Sea respectively. Both initiatives were initiated by the oil industry
and the governments in the respective countries in order to increase CQ-
operation between contractors and operators. They focus on how the
stakeholders in a supply chain through informal mechanisms and institutional
relationships may enhance common goals of long-term cost minimisation.
8
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Both initiatives try to build Up new business groups independent of how the
individual actors perceive ownership integration.14
According to (NorSok 1996:6) close co-operation between the customer and
the contractors
is a precondition if projects are to be completed in a faster and a less costly
way.... Mutual trust between the parties is imperative to succeed. The need for
formalities is replaced by a culture of work where the contractor and the
customer are expected to implicitly know what is right and what is wrong
based on agreed attitudes and objectives.
According to (Crabtree, Bower, and Keogh 1997), the outcome of the Crine
initiativ e for the oil companies, are savings of 30 per cent on capital
expenditure. The use of partnership and teamwork has played a significant
role in this process. Similar reductions of costs have been achieved in Norway,
even though this has led many suppliers into financial distress.15
Having said this, trust can vary across locations for a given sector. We know,
for instance, that the sub-contracting system of parts to Japanese car
manufacturers is based more on trust and long-term relationships than the
corresponding American system, although the technology is the same (Helper
1991; Sako and Helper 1998).
NorSok does not ad dress meçhanisms that can create trust and how trust can
influence the way agents deal with each other. It rather appeals to the moral
obligations of the parties. Sako and Helper (1998) analyse d such mechanisms
in the automobile industry and found that trust increases with the information
flow between the parties and by the level of technical assistance provided by
the customer. The building of trust can be reg arde d as an investment. Trust
between an oil company and the main supplier (or between the first and
second-tier suppliers) represents a sort of 'relation-specific skill' (Asanuma
1989). This means that changing partners has switching costs, which
ultimately strengthens the glue in the chain.
Except for the integration of suppliers in the decision-making process for
technical solutions, Statoil is not explicit regarding what is meant by the
creation of relationships and what partnerships mean for the (independent)
14 One additional reason for the upbeat Norwegian atttude towards NORSOK is that it
stimulates the development of a national supply industry (at least in its home market) . Trusts
between independent actors are probably easier to establish between firms from the same
country since they share common cultural conceptions, at least a common language. The ide a
of an integrated supply chain based on trust, as described by Trondslien and base on the
NorSok (and Crine) initiatives, represents a way of promoting a national supplier industry in
a legal con text where national discrimination is not allowed. Similar initiatives are not taken
in Angola, partly because there are other available instruments which can be applied for the
same objective.
15 In Njord in the Norwegian part of the North Sea, a 40 per cent cost reduction was achieved
due to changes in project organisation.
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parties. A business partner can, for instance, be a buyer in one relationship
and become a seller or a competitor in other relationships. So what is thei glue i in the chain? This is the topic of the next section.
10
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3. Theories of the firm
Our knowledge of the 'glue', both in terms of the type of factors holding the
different firms in the chain together and the degree of integration in the chain
are limited. In section 2.2 we discussed the trade-off between integration and
specialisation, represented by an oil company undertaking most activities in-
house, and a company basing its operations on arm's length trade with
independent firms specialising in a particular tas k respectively. In section 2.3,
the creation of relationships and trust between independent partners were
pinpointed as a factor increasing the costs of switching partners in the chain,
and thereby cern en ting the existing trading practice.
This section se eks to present hypotheses concerning the organisation of
supply chains in Angola based on the property right perspective of the firm.
The underlying question is: When wil a firm choose a particular strategy
regarding i) choice of market segment and ii) supply chain management (cf.
section 2.2)7 In section four, we present our results and discuss these in light
of alternative theories.
The degree of vertical integration is one indicator of the strength of the glue
in the supply chain. A measure of this is external procurement as a share of
value added (or value added as a share of sales) . If this share is low for a
particular task (compared to other firms in the sector) , it indicates that
production is undertaken in-house. If it is low for all the tasks, the supply
chain degenerates to a fully vertically integrated multinational energy provider
(such as Hallburton or an oil company which undertakes all activities in-
house). If the share is high, the supply chain consists of independent firms.
Independent ownership structure, however, do es not mean that transactions
are based on arms' length trade:
. The contract partners are integrated oil service units. A contract partner
may be involved in more than one task (cf. Table 1) at the same time,
either through acquisition or through long-term relationships.
. There are dose relationships between the contract partners and the oil
company (as discussed in section 2.3).
3.1 . Transaction costs
The property right approach is inspired by transaction costs analysis, and we
wil start by presenting some of that theory's main hypotheses. According to
transaction cost analysis, governance structure is treated as a dependent
variable (Klein, Crawford, and A1chian 1978; Wiliamson 1985). Between the
polar extreme of arm's length trade and vertical integration, the deg re e of
integration is ass urne d to be increasing with asset specificity, uncertaintyand
the frequency of transactions (the fixed costs of internal governance are spread
11
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on more transactions). 16 The degree of integration between companies in a
supply chain can be analysed by a similar approach.
When transactions are characterised by ass et specificity, the value of the
transactions has a higher value between the parti es than outside the
relationship. The extreme case is a trans action with no value outside the
relationship, e.g., a technology development undertaken by an upstream firm
which can only be applied by a particular oil company. Although such cases
are rarely found in any industry, it is nonetheless a fact that different oil
companies apply different types of technologies or standards. This implies
that upstream firms may undertake relation-specific investments with a
resulting risk of hold-ups, since it is costly to switch to a different buyer. The
outcome is that the firm risks to underinvest in technology improvements.
There are three types of transaction-specific assets: 11
. When assets are immobile once in place, we have site specificity. Site
specificity is most relevant during the production phase. The extreme cases
are pipelines, fixed installations or platforms and yards. The theory
predicts that:
. An increasing degree of site specificity increases the tendency of
vertical integration. Since floating platforms are more mobile than
fixed platforms, the tendency for oil companies to own them
consequently is lower. 18
. The lower the number of suppliers of particular goods and services,
the greater the frequency of internal production. If, for instance,
goods and services have to be provided locally and few service
providers are available, the oil company is unable to switch to other
suppliers and it wil tend to integrate production (catering and
transport facilties are good examples).
. Human asset specificity describes transaction-specific knowledge or human
capital achieved through specialised training or learning by doing (e.g.
engineering competence). Transaction costs theory predicts accordingly
that increasing engineering intensity of a task tends to favour integration.
Engineering competence of particular relevance for an oil field or a
particular operator (e.g. reservoir knowledge and the engineering of a
platform) should accordingly be owned by the oil company. Nevertheless,
16 Uncertainty by itself do 
es not lead to integration without asset specificity. If there is no asset
specificity and thus many potential suppliers of a component for which future demand is
uncertain, it may be cheaper to buy it in the market than produce it yourself.
l1There is a fourth type termed dedicated assets which refers to cases in which substantial
general purpose investments would not have been made outside a particular transaction
serving a large customer. Strategic delays or temporal asset specificity are used by (Masten
1986) as a fith type of asset specificity. Particularly in the oil industry, delays can be used
strategically by the upstream firms.
18At least in the Angolan case, most deepwater platforms are more or less mobile although
ownership structure varies. Yards are mainly owned by the main contractors (jointly with
Sonangol) .
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oil companies tend to employ engineers with reservoir competence and
frequently hire in other type of engineers from independent contractors.
. When equipment and machinery are relation-specific, we have physical
asset specificity. Masten (1984) uses component 'complexity' as ameasure
of ass et specificity, but since most of the technology in the oil sector is
complex, this measure does help explain the difference in the degree of
vertical integration between different phases. For instance, refining
technology is a general-purpose technology and similar across firms, while
upstream technology is more complex. Despite this, one sees more
integration downstream than upstream. What distinguishes the different
upstream technologies is that they are tailored toward specific fields (the
technology and complexity of the conditions (such as pressure) in
deepwater fields differs from shallow water or onshore), contractors or oil
companies. This means input is differentiated and the supplier may risk a
hold-up. The theory gives similar predictions as above.
In sum: the transaction cost of using the intermediate product market is lower
the more suppliers locate dose to the oil companies in a given offshore
province; the less consequential the oil company's costs of switching between
suppliers; the more standardised the inputs; the more effectively technical
change can be organised through the market; the stronger the long-term
relationships between contractors; and the higher the internal relocation costs
(Hallwood 1992). According to this theory, we would therefore expect the
supply chain in Angola to be more integrated than in the North Sea.
One of the weaknesses with transaction co st analysis isthat it mainly focuses
on the costs (transaction costs) and benefits (economics of scale) of market
transactions, not on the costs of vertical integration. One of the costs of
vertical integration is that it may give lower incentives for an upstream firm
to undertake product development and innovation since the downstream firm
(as an owner) can refuse the upstream firm to apply the technology other
places. ¡g Such incentives are of particular importance when the upstream firm,
by its actions, has a great influence on the downstream agents value of the
product, as was discussed in section 2.3 above.
3.2. A property right perspective
The central question, addressed by Grossman and Hart (1986), is why do we
have firms? In a world of complete contracts (which can be verifed by a third
party), firms are to some extent unnecessary. Transactions can be handled by
independent actors based on arm's length trade. However, when contracts are
incomplete, ownership (firms) are necessary in order to give proper investment
incentives. Based on the same approach, we might ask why we have a gro up of
firms organised as a supply chain. Similar to the tradition In transaction costs
¡g But integration represents one way of acquiring firm-specific knowledge. The recent merger
of Coflexip and Aker represents one example of this. One problem with such a strategy is that
it gives few incentives for Aker for further improvement of its deepwater technology. Confer
section 4.2.
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analysis, the degree of integration of the supply chain is the endogenaus
variable and the key issue is what type of hierarchical (governance) structure
wil most efficiently faciltate product innovation or quality improvement by
the upstream firm.
In Grossman and Harts modellng approach, each agent owns his own human
capital, but a firm is a set of non-human assets under common ownership.
Ownership of assets is important because it gives the owner bargaining power
under unforeseen contingencies (which require bargaining) and it confers
ownership of goods. The ownership of non-human assets affects the ex ante
incentives to invest in human capital and the boundary of the firm is
determined by the agents needs to protect their investments. According to this
theory, firms are only needed in order to deal with incomplete contracts and
the focus in the analysis is therefore on the incomplete part of contracts.
As regards the oil industry, it is reasonable to assurne that contracts are
incomplete in the sense that not all contingencies are covered. Complex
technologies and uncertainties require extensive applications of functional
contracts and change orderss. The property right perspective is therefore an
interesting point of departure for analysing the structure of the supply chain
(see (Kvaløy 2000)for a discussion).
Grossman and Hart focus on formal structures (ownership) between firms, but
do not analyse self-enforcing informal structures such as the parties' concern
for their reputation. Baker, Gibbons and Murphy (1997) extend Grossman
and Hart s model by analysing the interplay between formal structures and
informal relationships (relational contracts), particularly how the former
facilitates the feasibilty of the latter. Trust and partnership, discussed in
section 2.3, is one example of a relational contract. This interplay can be
analysed both between firms and within a firm (for instance between different
departments). In contrast to the transaction cost approach where 'relational
contracts' are placed in a continuum along one dimension (degree of
ownership), Baker and Gibbons distinguish between two dimensions and four
prototypes of ownership/governance regimes (see Table 2).
Table 2: Outsourcing versus integrationI lo h' E twners ip nvironmen
Governance N on Integrated Integrated
Environment (Upstream owns) (Oownstream owns)
Spot ('arm's length') Spot Outsourcing Spot Employment
(1) (2)
Relational Relational Outsourcing Relational Employment
(3) (4)
There are two agents, an upstream firm and a downstream firm. The upstream
party produces an item that can be used in a downstream party's production
process. The upstream firm may undertake observable but unverifiable
investments in the good such as technology improvement. Let us assurne that
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no investments are made by the downstream firm.20 Oownstream firms (oil
companies or main contractors) want upstream firms to invest in order to
improve quality or technology and thereby reduce costs. After observing the
value of the good to the buyer and the seller, the parties negotiate the price
and split the gain according to a N ash bargaining solution. Ownership matters
because it determines the stakeholders' threatpoints under the negotiations
and thereby the way in which the gain is split between the players. This split in
turn influences the parties' incentives to invest. The theory can be applied to
analyse the relationship between an oil company (downstream firm) and its
contract partner (upstream firm). But it can also be used to analyse the
relationship between the main contractor (this time interpreted as a
downstream firm) and its sub-contractors (upstream firm). According to the
theory, there are two ways of doing this: asset ownership and relational
contracts. For spot transactions, ownership is the main incentive mechanism.
Let us start by analysing such a case.
If the upstream firm owns the asset, the transaction is non-integrated and the
upstream producer is an independent contractor using his own assets. We can
term this outsourcing. This reflects the segmented supply chain as depicted in
the left -hand part of Figure 1, and one would expect it to characterise not only
the supply chain of standard ise d products but also upstream differentiated
products with general (non-relation-specific) technology.
When the downstream firm owns the asset, asset ownership is integrated and
we can call it 'employment. Under employment the downstream firm can
renege and refuse to pay a potential bonus for technology improvement.
Knowing this, without any reputation mechanism in place hindering the
downstream firm from reneging, an upstream firm wil not invest. 21
If the upstream agent owns the assets, he can negotiate with the downstream
agent about the sale price (a possibilty that is unavailable if a downstream
agent owns the asset) . Should the downstream party dedare the promised
bonus too high the upstream party wil obtain more resources. Under spot
employment, the upstream firm has no incentives for cost reduction while
under spot outsourcing an upstream firm does have such incentives. In cases
where it is important for a (oil) company to provide incentives for investments
in east reductions and technology improvements (and explicit contracts are
not attainable), it is therefore important to outsource (1 in Table 2) part of
their activities. However, outsourcing creates a temptation ex post for the
upstream party (the main contractors) to renege by dedaring the bonus too
low. Asset specificity is a mechanism that can prevent the upstream firm from
reneging since its outside option is weaker (see K valøy 2000 for an
elaboration) .
20 See Wiig 1995 for an example where the downstream firm undertakes investment.
21 The importance of ownership reduces as the frequency with which the parties deal with
each other rises.
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When the parties have more frequent interactions, as assumed in the case of
the oil market, the sales price or bonus can form the basis of a relational
contract (cf. (3) or (4) in Table 2) enforced by the parties' concerns about their
reputation. In contrast to spot transactions, a downstream firm, say a main
contractor, can provide incentives for technology improvements to an
upstream firm even as an owner.
Relational contracts between integrated parties ('relational employment)
differ from those between non-integrated ('outsourcing') parties in the ways
the parties attempt to renege.22 Under relational outsourcing the upstream firm
may undertake investments which improve its best alternative (threatpoint)
and thereby its bargaining position. However, in the integrated case, the
upstream firm has no resources if the downstream firm dedares poor
performance and is unwiling to pay the bonus. 
23 In a relational contract, the
downstream party prornises a bonus (say B, where B;:O if performance is
good). In the non- integrated case, the upstream firm can extract some of the
value of the good through bargaining (say S, where S-eB). Reneging under
integration saves B, but reneging under non-integration saves the difference (B-
S), and the temptation not to renege is therefore less under non-integration.
This reduced temptation makes it credible to prornise a larger bonus to an
independent contractor.
3.2.1. Predietions derived from the property right
approach
. As in transaction cost analysis, one would expect assets to be more
relation-specific and complexin Angola than in Norway, with a
subsequent tendency towards integration ((2) or (4)).
. The importance of outsourcing (ownership) increases (decreases) by the
importance of providing incentives for cost reduction or technological
improvement. One should accordingly expect (1) or (3) in Table 2 to be
more common in Angola than in Norway, particularly between the oil
company and the main contractors.
. Higher disco unt rates make relational contracts less likely. While the
operation risk is quite similar between Norway and Angola, the country
risk (the oil companies face a severe political risk in terms of civil war,
corruption 24and human development) is higher in Angola. Increasing risk
22 A key difference between outsourcing and employment with relational contracts is that the
goods value in its alternative use affects the reneging decision under relational outsourcing,
but not under relational employment.
23 Under relational outsourcing changes in market factors influence the parties' incentives to
renege. When prices are low, downstream may require reneging and conversely, when prices
are high, upstream firms may require to renege. From such a perspective one would expect the
degree of integration to increase by the variance of prices. To the extent that oil prices are
more variable than the prices of goods and services procured by the oil companies, one would
expect that oil companies are more integrated downstream than upstream. Hence, this theory
is in accordance with observed phenomena in the oil industry.
24 Cf. Global Witness report on Angola where Elf in particular is blamed for its non-
transparent actions (Global 1999).
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has the same effect as an increasing discount rate. An additional factor
making relational contracts more diffcult to sustain is that deepwater
fields in Angola represent markets where many of the agents have no prior
experiences with each other and therefore have not been able to create a
reputation. Cultural and political differences may also impede the
development of trust, and is pinpointed as an explanation why automobile
industry supply chains differ in Japan and the US. Angola is a 'new' oil-
producing country, and local Angolan companies have yet not established
brands for quality as has happened in Norway. Accordingly, one should
expect spot transactions, particularly with domestic firms, to be more
common in Angola than in Norway ((1) or (2)).
. Acquisition and mergers represent a way of getting access to new
technology (for instance, pipes in deepwater), new customers (oil
companies) and a greater market (by providing integrated solutions).
Although this is a general phenomenon in the supply industry, it is
particularly important in new markets characterised by a high degree of
uncertainty.
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4. Su~ chain management in Angola
Guided by the discussion in Section 2, we can identify some essential variables
to help us analyse the structure of the supply chain in Angola. We wil
emphasise the following factors:
. Characteristics of the contracts awarded in terms of: i) number of contracts
and their size; ii) incentives provided.
. The complexity of technology and ass et specificity, induding the location
of production.
. Ownership structures between the contract partners;
. The informal network between the contract partners.
The number of contracts awarded and their size represent a measure of the
degree of integration in the chain. They also provide information about the
relationships between the contract partners. If ane contract is awarded only,
for instance, the contractor is likely either to be an integrated oil service firm
providing all services from driling to production or subcontracts some of
these tasks to independent firms. In both cases, the contractor represents the
guarantor of the obligations of the upstream firms to the oil company, and the
contractor either has to be an integrated oil service firm providing all services
from driling to operation or subcontract some of the m to independent firms.
The other extreme is a situation where there are numerous contracts between
the oil company and its suppliers. In the first place, it is a bilateral relationship
between thecontract partner and the oil company, but in the second place,
the se relations are fragmented.
The incentives provided also give a measure of the degree of integration.
Providing high-powered incentives to contractors indicates that the
transactions between the partners are characterised by market transactions.
We wil focus on the incentives provided by the oil company towards their
contractors.
Ownership is a direct measure of integration, and we wil emphasise how
contract partners through acquisitions and lYs have integrated different tasks
or market segments (cf. Table 1).
While the indicators above refer to the governance structure of the chain, or
how the supply chain is organised, the last two refer to some variables that
influence this organisation.
The informal network between the contract partners indicates how diffcult it
is to sustain relational contracts. We discuss the agents previous experience
and common culture.
Regarding technology, we are particularly concerned about the parties' fear of
imitation.
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We structure the following analysis along the four factors mentioned above,
and restrict the analysis to two deepwater fields, namely Girassol and Kuito
which were analysed in section 4.1 and 4.2 respectively.25 Girassol was
discovered by Elf in 1996, while Chevron encountered the Kuito only a year
after. The entire field development bil for Girassol is USO 2.5 bn, which is far
more than Chevron's cost of developing the Kuito Field. In the following, we
therefore put more emphasis on the Girasoll field
4.1. Girassol
Girassol is located in Block 17, and both Statoil and Hydro are partners.
Nearly all wells that Elf has driled in Block 17 have been positive and there
are more than ten individual discoveries.
4.1.1. Few, but sizeab/e contracts awarded
Let us start with the condusion of this sub-section and present the details
afterwards. With regard to the characteristics of the contract, our main
condusion is that since fewer, but large r contracts are awarded at Girasoll, the
contractors in the chain are more integratedthan in Norway. Main
contractors are providing a bundle of goods and services and are characterised
by integrated ownership ((2) or (4) in Table 2). Nevertheless, in terms of
incentives, the chain is more fragmented, at least between the oil company and
the main contractors ((1) or (3)). Since strong incentives are provided to the
main contractors, this indicates that the relationship between the main
contractors and the operator is based on market transactions. One important
explanation is that the oil company seeks to reduce uncertainty.26
Based on a sealed bid procedure (bidders were unable to match each others'
offers), the three largest contracts awarded for the development of Girassol
were the i) FPSO ((2) and (3) in Table 1); ii) the FUR ((4) and part of (5)) and
ii) the contract for subsea equipment (part of 5). 21 The total values of these
contracts amount to USD 1,5 bilion (or 60 per cent oftotal development
costs). In addition, two main contracts were awarded for driling (1).
Bouygues offshore (BOS) plays a leading role in the FPSO contract through its
50 per cent stake in Mar Profundo Girassol (MAR). 28 Mar wil handle the
design, engineering, procurement, construction and installation of the FSOP.
25 Fieldwork was undertaken in Luanda March 2000, where we made interviews with the
main contract partners in the two fields. All main contract partners in the two fields have
offces in Luanda. Alexander's Gas and Oil Online (http://www.gasandoil.com/goc/companyJ)
and the homepages of the firms involved, have been used to collect additional information.
26Given high degree of uncertainty in Angola and strong incentives provided, the main
contractors operating in Angola need significant financial strength.
27 FPSO refers to floa ting production storage and offoading barge and offoading buoy. FUR
refers to flowlines, umbicals and risers.28 MAR is a 50/50 joint venture between BOS and ETPM for the supply of the FSOP. ETPM
has just recently been bought by the Norwegian company Stolt Comex. After the acquisition,
the new name of the company is Stolt Offshore.
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MAR has commissioned the construction of the FSOP to a yard in South
Korea.
BOS als o plays a significant role in the FUR contract through its 33 per cent
stake in Alto Mar Girasoii.2g Alto Mar wil handle the design, engineering,
fabrication, and installation of FUR (including the installation of production
manifolds and the tie-in of the subsea wells).
Table 3: Main contracts awarded at GirasoIl
Product Company in charge USD Time frame Production
Milion
i) FPSO Mar Profundo Girassol 700 Last part of Mostly from
(Equal shares BOS and 2000 South Korea
ETPM)
ii) FUR Alto Mar Girassol 450 Phases starting Prefabrication in
(Equal shares BOS, in 2000. Angola.
ETPM and Stolt FDS ship from
Comex Seaway) South Korea.
iii) Subsea Kongsberg Offshore 220 Delivered ELF in
equipment Norway
FMC Corporation's subsidiary Kongsberg Offshore has been awarded a
contract by Elf Exploration Angola to supply subsea equipment for the
Girassol project. All goods are delivered to ELF in Norway. A project team
consisting of staff from ELF is responsible for organising the Girasoll project
from Paris.
Elf takes all risks above a particular downside amount for the FSOP while
there is no downside amount for the FUR contract. The reason for this is that
the suppliers have more time for the FUR contract. The subsea equipment
contract is a fixed-price contract. A fixed-price contract gives the supplier high
incentives to achieve cost reductions. At the same time, the oil company does
not achieve any rewards from it. In the EPCI contracts applied in the North
Sea, the gain is split between the contractor and the operator and there is a
downside amount for the contractor's potential loss.
4.7.2. Technology and outsourcing
As in the previous section, we wil start with the conclusion and elaborate
details afterwards. None of the main contractors was afraid of hold-ups by the
oil company or that their technology might be imitated by competitors, either
indicating a low degree of physical asset specificity or that those asset -specific
assets were already integrated. In any case, the contractors merged with
upstream firms to get hold of new technologies and know-how and thereby
cover a larger part of the value chain ((2) or (4) in Table 1.) The production,
but not the engineering of the FSOP and FDE, are outsourced. Both results fit
29 Alto Mar is a joint venture between BOS, ETPM and Stolt Comex Seaway (with equal 1/3
stakes) .
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the theories discussed in the previous section: more advanced technology is
produced in-house while general-purpose technology is outsourced.
Girassol wil involve the largest infrastructure for such depths eve r installed, as
well as innovative technology. 
30 The FSOP wil be the large st to date and have
a storage capacity of 2,000,000 barreis and a production capacity of 200,000
barreis per day (bpd). 31 Hyunday Heavy Industries Co Ltd has already built
the steel hull in Korea, and the plan is to build the topsides at the BOS yard in
France.32
In the choice of contract partners for the sub-sea and FUR contracts, a
primary concern was the choice of technological solution. According to Stolt
Offshore (one of the partners in Alto Mar) , a key to the success ofthe FUR
bid was the novel concept of three towers housing all the risers.33 The
technology for these riser towers is the property of Stolt Comex and Doris
Engineering. 
34 The riser tower concept has already been in use in the US Gulf
of Mexico and is less costly than that of conventional flexible flowlines and
risers applied in Kuito.
The subsea contract provides FMC/Kongsberg to install and operate its HOST
2500 technology at a record depth. HOST 2500 is a modular, remote-
controlled subsea production system. Hydrocarbons wil be produced through
subsea production systems connected to a FPSO. Subsea systems integration
inc1udes wellheads, Christmas trees, manifolds, flowline connection systems,
controis, and well intervention equipment. All products are delivered to Elf in
Norway, but are produced by different FMC subsidiaries all over the world.
The wells wil be drilled from one semisubmersible rig (Sedco Express) and
one dynamically positioned drilship (Pride Africa). Both are new ships rente d
by Elf, but owned by the contractors, Transocean Sedco Forex Inc. and Pride
International Inc respectivel y. 35
30 There wil be 40 subsea wells, of which 23 wil be producing; 14 water injection and three
gas injection wells. Production per well wil range as high as 40,000 bpd; Girassol is 18 km
long and 10 km wide. Girassol base case reserves are estimated around 700 milion bbls. The
high reservoir quality allows for the driling of few wells for effcient drainage.
31 The deck is 180m long by 60m wide. It weighs approximately 20 000t. It contains living
quarters, oil treatment, storage, metering and offoading, gas treatment and reinjection
facilities. The process dec k is located 7m above the deck of the hull. It contains facilties for
produced water treatment as well as facilities for gas lift, gas compression and gas
dehydration.
32 The plan was to bu ild the topsides as an innovative 'integrated deck' in France and load the
deck onto the hull. However, the contract for the topsides was re-awarded to Hyunday Heavy
Industries. The cost is approximately USD 300 milion.
33 The Girassol Riser Tower can house 6 flowlines and a num ber of service lines. The flowlines
are totally interchangeable. The base of these riser towers wil be connected to the subsea
production system, which includes 23 subsea production wells and 14 water injectors, using
flowline bundles connected to the FSOP by conventional flexible risers.34 http://www.stoltcomexseaway.com
35 Transocean Offshore Inc., a successor to Transocean ASA and Sonat Offshore, completed a
merger with Sedco Forex in December 1999, which was spun-off from Schlumberger Limited.
The resulting company, Transocean Sedco Forex Inc., is now the worlds largest offshore
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As discussed in greater detail in the following section, it is noticeable that BOS
has bought Ooris Engineering while Stolt Offshore has bought ETPM and
NKT Flexibles, a manufacturer of flexible pipes and risers. Two of the main
contract partners have thereby integrated important technology providers (as
would be expected according to trans action cost analysis).
This contrasts to the fragmentation of construction activities. In the FSOP
contract, Hyunday is the main sub-contractor, while the field development
ship (FDE) is bought from Samsung. Both are new ships (due to the long
duration of the field). The FDE ship is owned by Saibos, ajoint venture
between BOS and the Italian firm Saipem and it wil be used at Girassol (the
FUR contract) and in Brazil. 36 This contract alone is worth approximately
USO 150 milion.
Except for the local content of the FUR contract (see below), most
construction activities are currently procured externally, particularly at
shipyards in South Korea. This fragmentation also contrasts with the structure
of the supply chain in Norway where, for instance, the Norwegian firm Aker
constructs platforms at their own yards.
driling contractor and third-largest oilfield services company in terms of equity market
capitaliiation. Schlumberger stockholders hold about 52 per cent of the outstanding shares of
Transocean Sedco Forex. Transocean Sedco Forex owns Sedco Express and has constructed
approximately 70 per cent of all wells in water depths greater than 5,000 feet. The company
designed and bu ilt the first jackup in the North Sea including the first jackup operating in
more than 250 feet. These jackups played a vital industrial role, driling the first exploration
and development wells for oil and gas in the North Sea. Currently, the is company launching
the first fifth-generation semisubmersible rigs with three Sedco Express units in 2000. These
next -generation semisubmersibles are estimated to be able to reduce total well construction
time by 25 per cent and total well construction costs by 30 per cent. One of these wil operate
in Angola. Aker Gulf Marine's fabrication yard is producing a second one which wil be used
in Mexico.36Saipem provides driling and construction services to oil and gas companies worldwide.
Saipem is 43 per cent-owned by ENI, an oil company controlled by the Italian government.
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The Riser Towers and Flowline Bundles as they wil be installed.
Source: http://ww.offshore-
technology. com/projects/girassol/index.html #girassol6
4.1.3. Ownership, investments andjoint ventures for
comp/ementing energy activities
Two main conc1usions can be drawn from this section:
. The contracting firms are integrated oil service firms providing a bundle of
goods; Acquisition is an important way to achieve integration.
. They have establishedjoint ventures with the national oil company
Sonangol. 31
31 Similar arguments have be 
en made elsewhere. BOS recently won two big contracts in the
Caspian pipeline projects, partly because of their ability to form a strong partnership with
their Russian partners.
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Before the acquisition of ETPM by Stolt Offshore, Bouygues was the mai n
contract partner at GirassoL. It was established in 1975 as part of the French
Bouygues Group. BOS specialises in providing integrated solutians for the
design, construction, installation and management of offshore and onshore oil
and gas production-related turnkey projects.
BOS has strengthened its position in the market for energy services. With the
recent acquisition of Doris Engineering, BOS covers the entire value chain
from basic engineering to maintenance, including detail engineering,
procurement, construction and installation (but not operation and subsea
equipment). Net sales in 1999 were approximately Euro 1 bilion.38 The group
has approximately 100,000 employees and a turnover of Euro 15 bilion.
BOS forme d the construetion firm Petromar Uem Angola in 1984, a 70/30
joint venture between BOS and Sonangol. Petromar owns the Soyo K wanda
Base and has builtjackets both for Chevron and Elf. BOS created a firm, OHL
(a joint venture company where Sonangol and BOS are partners), undertaking
all the logistics (catering and accommodation)).
The other contract partner, the French firm ETPM, was established in the
1960s and has 2,000 employees. It specialises in turnkey projects and deepsea
work covering design, procurement, installation and commissioning of
offshore platforms and specialised structures.
ETPM not only provides goods and services to ELF, but also goods to
Chevron in block O. Until recently ETPM was owned by Groupe GTM (with a
turn over of USO 8.4 bilion and 61,000 employees), but has recently been sold
to Stolt Comex Seaway. GTM has kept an 8 per cent stake. The new
company's name is Stolt Offshore.
With more than 25 years' experience, Stolt Offshore is now one of the largest
offshore contractors in the international offshore oil and gas industry. After
Coflexip it is the most important player in the world-wide subsea market (see
section 4.2.2). Stolt-Nielsen S.A., one of the world's leading providers of
integrated transportation services for bulk liquid chemicals, owns 53 per cent
of Stolt Offshore S.A. Stolt Offshore operates the worlds largest fleet of
specialist subsea construction ships. The Company offers customers total field
development solutians and its capabilties inc1ude design, supply and
installation of all of the subsea architecture from the subsea wellheads to fixed
or floating process platforms (primary (2), (3), (4) and (5) in Table 1). With
the acquisition of ETPM, Stolt complements its activities and competence with
i) competence in engineering of all types of platforms; ii) fabrication through
ETPM's yards in Nigeria and in Angola;3g iii) pipelay (ETPM has broad
competence to lay pipes of all sizes and in all water depths).
38BOS has recently bought Kvaerner, France.
39Stolt Offshore owns 55 per cent of Sonamet (Sonangol holds 40 per cent). Sonamet
fabricates metallc platforms and pipes and has 500 persons working at its yard in Lobito.
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On their side, Stolt complements ETPM's activities by their abilty to provide
services which ETPM previously bought externally, such as diving, service
activities and the production of flexible flowlines and dynamic flexible risers
(through NKT Flexibles where Stolt Offshore holds 49 per cent stake). Stolt
also undertakes activities previously assumed by subcontractors., and covers a
wider geographical area than ETPM (by undertaking work in the Gulf of
Mexico, Asia Pacific and Brazil in addition to North Sea, West Africa and the
Middle East where ETPM operates). The combined group had a turnover in
1999 of about USD 1.3 bilion.
NKT Flexibels is one of three worldwide firms providing flexible pipes,and,
with its acquisition in December 1999, Stolt Offshore has access to one of
these manufacturers. NKT is providing 17 flexible risers for GirassoL.
The same pattern as described above, that of an integrated energy provider, is
not applicable to the final contract partner, Kongsberg Offshore, except that it
belongs to a bigger group of firms. FMC Corporation is one of the worlds
leading producers of chemicals and machinery for industry and agriculture
and has 16,000 employees. Kongsberg specialises in subsea equipment with
sales of US0300 milion last year; 40
For the FUR contract, a factor supporting the choice of Alto Mar was that all
pre-fabrication work wil be carried out in Angola. Since all sizeable contracts
need approval from Sonangol, they support solutions where local suppliers are
involved. BOS us es local firms (e.g., DHL) to de al with the logistics. The
towers are to be produced at ETPM's Lobito yard and the flowlines at
Bouygues' Soyo yard.41 In both cases, Sonangol is a partner in the managing
firm. A similar pattern can be seen in the driling contract.
Pride International and 51 per cent joint owner Sonangol have just completed
the construction of the Pride Africa and the Pride Angola, two ultra-deepwater
drilships. The drilships are contracted to work offshore Angola for initial
terms of five and three years, respectively.42
4.1.4. The informal network between the contract
partners and ELF
The main conc1usion to be derived from this section is that dose ties prevailing
between the operator and some of the contract partners can partly be
explained by a (French) common cultural background, but more important is
40 Kongsberg employs 600 people at its headquarters in Kongsberg, Norway, and 200 people
at its Offshore Service Department in Bergen, Norway.
41 Source: Alexander's Gas and OiL. Volum e 3, issue #22, Monday, September 14 1998 and
various press releases from Bouygues offshore.42 Pride International, Inc. is ane of the worlds largest driling contractors, operating a diverse
fleet of rigs on a global basis. The Company provides offshore and onshore driling, workover
and related services in more than 20 countries with a fleet of almost 300 rigs. In 1999, Pride
had revenues of $620 milion and 5,900 employees.
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the long-Iasting previous association between the operator and the contract
partners.
BOS has a long-term experience from West Africa, and has its own yard
(Boscongo) in Congo where it producedjackets for Elf in the beginning of the
1980s. From the same yard, BOS constructed several platforms for Chevron in
Angola and Elf in Cameroon and Angola. The Pal PIplatform for Elf Angola
was also produced in Congo in the beginning of the 1980s. lackets for Elf
were produced in Angola (Soyo).
BOS has therefore considerable experience of Western Africa, including
Angola. It has been dealing with a number of oil companies, but Elf
predominates. In fact, in 1981, Elf acquired a 34 per cent stake in the equity
capital ofBOS.43 which it sold back in 1990. ETPM has a similar record. It is
originally French, and has long experience in West Africa. It has worked in
Nigeria, Cameron, Cabon and Congo. With BOS, it was responsible for the
Nkosa field in Congo for Elf. N either BOS nor ETPM has any frame
agreements with any oil companies (but BOS provides maintenance to block O
(operated by Chevron) and block 3 (operated by Elf).
As regards Kongsberg Offshore, it is a subsidiary of FMC, which has much
experience with ELF all over the world. The Swiss branch of FMC
International has a contract with ELF, Angola for service and installation
operating from its supply base in Luanda. Kongsberg wil provide assistance
throughout the installation phase. Kongsberg Offshore also has a long-term
contract with the two Norwegian partners in block 17, Statoil and Norsk
Hydro.
Since none of the contract partners was afraid of technology imitations or
potential hold-ups, we can infer that that other mechanisms than technology
link them to ELF. They have known each other for a long time. ETPM and
BOS are French of origin and share the same cultural and linguistic
background as ELF. Nevertheless, this can hardly be the most important
reason for the choice of contract partners, because if that been the case,
Coflexip rather than Stolt offshore would been awarded the subsea contract.
We have no information on the internal informal relationships within the
integrated contract partner. However, one must presume that Stolt Offshore
and ETPM have enjoy long-term relationships, which may stimulate product
innovation by the upstream firm (ETPM) .
The following tab le summarises the relationship between the main contract
partners at Girasoll according to the typologies applied in Table 2 (where (3)
indicates non-integration, but relational contract, and (3-) indicates that the
contract is relationally biased but also include elements of spot transactions) .
43 This is one of the few examples where a constructor is owned by the oil company (Saipem is
another) .
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Table 4: Typologies of contracts at Girassol: A wrapping up
Operator/Contractor Contractor/sub-
contractors
FSOP (3-) (1)
I FURSubsea I ~~~) I (4)
4.2. Kuito
Kuito is located in Block 14, which is operated by Chevron (holding of 31 per
cent).44 U P to Octo ber 2000. six discoveries had been made in block 14. Kuito
is the first field to be developed.
While Elf has been criticised for slowness in puttng Girassol on stream,
Chevron has made a speedy start-up at Kuito. However, this comparison
misses the important differences between the fields in terms of location, size
and deepwater level. Kuito is merelya step out of Chevron's Block O
operations offshore Angola. It was easy to develop a facilty and tie it to the
inshore production. Chevron was, however, unsure about the real size of the
field, and its connections to other sites nearby. They therefore wanted to speed
up the process to gain production experience and gather reservoir data.
Moreover, Kuitio is located in 350 meters of water, which makes it a
considerable lot easier to develop than GirassoL. In spite of these differences,
the structure of Chevron and Elf's supply chains is quite similar as set out in
the following.
4.2.7. Contracts awarded and technologyapplied
Chevron opted for a fast but phased development of Kuito. The first phase
brought together ABB and Coflexip Sten a Offshore (CSO) in a consortium
headed by the Monaco-registered firm SBM (Single Buoy Mooring Inc). SBM
was responsible for the FSOP, the mooring system and export facilities and for
the management of the consortium. As in the Girasoll development, a small
number of contract partners cover most of the procurement, indicating an
integrated chain. The contract partners play a more important role in Kuito
than GirassoL, since they are in charge of production. Chevron therefore plays
a less dominant role in supply chain management in Kuito than ELF at
Girasoll.
In the case of Kuito. the contract partners were involved at an early stage of
development. SBM was brought on board already at discovery in April 1997 ,
and was directly involved from November the same year. Initially 14 suppliers
were asked to show their interest. and the final choice was between SBM and
the American firm Oceaneering InternationaL. SBM was chosen because it was
perceived to be technologically capable (onlya few energy servicing firms are
44 The remaining interests are held by Sonangol (20 per cent), Agip, a subsidiary of the Italian
state owned oil company ENI (20 per cent), Total (20 per cent) and Petrogal (9 per cent).
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able to undertake operations (cf. stage 6) and SBM already owned avessel
which could be used).
The initial development included the driling and completion of 12 subsea
production wells producing through horizontal trees, jumpers, and a subsea
production manifold connected to the FPSO, plus the completion of a gas re-
injection well. The contract value for the first phase was USO 400 milion.
This includes the installation of the FSOP along with a calm buoy, subsea trees
and manifolds, flowlines, risers and mooring systems.
The FPSO has a production capacity of 100,000 barre Is per day and a storage
capacity of 1.4 milion barreis. The ship, previously a turbin e tanker of
228,000 tons dw, was converted at a shipyard in Singapore. The topsides were
engineered by SBM's sister company Gusto Engineering. This FPSO is a zero
flare facility. Associated gas, not used for fuel for the FSOP, is injected into the
reservoir. Wells were driled and completed by the Sedco Forex.
The second phase was awarded to the same consortium in May 1999. It
consists of one subsea water injection centre with eight water injection wells.
CSO designe d , engineered and supplied approximately 20 km of flexible
flowlines and risers and 15 km ofumbicals (produced at OUCO, a Coflexip
company) and carried out the offshore installation work. CSO als o installed a
range of subsea equipment.45
ABB has supplied production trees (ABB Vetco-Gray horizontal trees) ,
production manifold (the heart of the subsea production centre) , water
injection trees and manifold, surface and subsea controls system, gas lift
distribution unit, subsea distribution unit and associated jumpers along with
all necessary installation tooling. Components, controls and engineering
systems for the Kuito project were built and provided from facilities in
Angola, USA, UK, Norway and Italy.
In October 2000, the same consortium was awarded the contract for the third
phase. This phase consists of an additional subsea production centre with
seven producing wells.46
As in GirassoL, the contract partners were not afraid of imitation of their
technology.
Leasing
In contrast to GirassoL, the oil company leases the platform. The FSOP is
leased from Sonasing, ajoint venture between SBM and Sonangol. The leasing
45 Press release Coflexip Stena Offshore Jan. 5. 2000.
46 CSO's workscope includes design, fabrication and installation of all flowlines, risers,
umbilcals and associatedjumpers required for the manifold and subsea tree hook-up;
transport and installation of manifold and umbilical termination units supplied by ABB; and
hook-up of 3 subsea trees to the manifold and associated umbilicals. Press release Coflexip
Stena Offshore Oct i 1. 5. 2000.
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period is five years, with the possibilityof an extension of five additional
years. The daily rate is fixed, but it is a small variable element based on an
operating agreement giving penalties and bonuses based on a complex set of
form ula. The consortium takes all risks of misspecification of costs and there
is no bottom line of losses. Therefore, incentives are provided to reduce the
fixed east of the FPSO, but no incentives to reduce variable easts (for same
reason, no incentives are provided to increase the production of oil).
According to the property right theory presented above, leasing gives fewer
incentives for increasing the oil production when the FSOP and the oil are
owned by different players. Chevron seems to have presse d for a leasing
solution because of uncertainty related to the size of the reservoir. The PSA
agreement makes it possible to deduct a certain amount of capital investments.
When an oil company owns the FSOP, and the field is smaller than expected
('nature is bad), an oil company risks not recovering all of its capital costs. In
contrast, by leasing, all leasing costs are recovered independently of nature's
whims. When nature is bad (good), the host government therefore receives
more (less) income compared to a leasing situation.41 However, when nature is
good (huge reservoir), Chevron has the flexibilty to get a bigger ship.
There are no reasons to believe that SBM had more information about the
reservoir than Chevron has. However, SBM has the advantage of dealing with
asymmetric asset specificity as regards the FSOP. Even though the technology
of the FSOP is general, and SBM is not afraid of imitation, its alternative value
is higher for a firm specialising in providing FSOPs for a number of firms than
for an oil company with the primary objective of exploring oiL. Partly for this
reason, SBM takes the risk of high residual value and relocation risk.
4.2.2 Ownership and acquisitions
In this section we discuss the main contract partners involved in our discussion
so far in more detaiL.
SBM - Roating terminals
SBM is specialised in stages 2, 3, 6 (confer Table 1). SBM is a wholly owned
subsidiary of the Dutch public company IHC Caland.48 SBM is a turnkey
47 If prospects are good, it therefore makes sense for a government like the Angolan to require
a more common use of leasing contracts. In fact, this is also what happens. Foreign operators
are now under pressure to lease, not buy, FPSO vessels in order to reduce initial investment
costs and increase early revenue flow for Angola. Financial Times Nov. 152000. "Angola to
firm grip on foreign oil companies. "
48 The Dutch public company IHC Caland N.V. is the holding company of a gro up of
international. marine technology-orientated companies. Its business is to serve on a global
basis the offshore oilfield service industry and the dredging, shipping and mining industries by
supplying engineered products, vessels, systems and contracting services. It has four shipyards
in the Netherlands. The products comprise mainly floating crude oil (un)loading systems,
stor age systems and production systems based on the single point mooring principle, hydraulic
pilehammers, custom-built and standard dredging and mining equipment, and custom-built
ships and FPSOs/FSOs which are chartered on a long-term basis to oil companies. In addition,
specialised engineering services are provided. Adapted from http://www.singlebuoy.com
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supplier or key element supplier in more than 50 per cent of the installed
floating terminals world-wide (based on the Single Point Moorings or SPM
principle). SBM has been involved in more than fify FSO or FPSO projects. In
addition to being a major supplier of SPMs, the company has gained
substantial experience in the conversion of trading tankers and the
construction of new-built units for FSO and FPSO projects. Most recently, ten
units of FSO and FPSO were scheduled to be in operation before year 2000 on
a leasing basis of which four are based in West Africa (for Elf in Congo and
Nigeria and for Chevron in Angola).
SBM has no world-wide alliance or frame agreement with Chevron or other
contract partners, but has an agreement with the Italian contractor Saipem to
cooperate on deepwater FPSO projects. Eni, a partner in the licence of block
14 holds 45 per cent of the shares in Saipem. Saipem provides subsea
construction (4) while SBM undertakes the operations. The two parties
therefore complement each otherand it gives the 'group' a position to be a
global offshore service provider (covering nearly the whole value chain except
for dril ing) .
Since the Angolan authorities prefer leasing contracts for the FPSOs, firms that
are able to handle the production phase wil be stimulated. This by itself can
have an impact on an oil service firm' s incentives to integrate or create
allances for given operations. In any case, the success in the Kuito field, the
importance of being involved early on in the development of new fields (SBM
with Brown and Root have undertaken a front end engineering and design
study in Exxon's block 15) and the experience from co-operation with
Chevron, indicate that SBM wil play an increasingly more important role in
the future. To underline this, it has already been requested to bid for a FSOP
at Kizambo field, which is located in block 15 (ABB, Aker and Bouygues and
Mustang have also been asked to bid).
ABS - A global engineering and technology company
In upstream oil production, ABB is specialised in subsea equipment (5), but is
als o involved in engineering (2). ABB provides power generation,
transmission, and distribution; automation; oil, gas, and petrochemicals;
industrial products and contracting; and financial services. The Group
reported orders in 1998 of USD 31 bilion and employed about 200,000
people in more than 100 countries.
ABB has a three-year world-wide allance with ESSO and Chevron providing
subsea dril ing equipment, but no frame agreements with the other contract
partners.
C50- Acquisitions for comp/ementing activities
CSO provides a wide range of services (project management, engineering
design, procurement, subsea pipeline and umbilical laying, construction and
maintenance work) and products (design and manufacture of flexible pipes,
control umbilcals and remotely operated vehic1es). CSO is the biggest world-
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wide subsea-contracting firm with a market share of 30 per cent as against
Stolt Offshore's 20 per cent and Hallburton's 15 per cent.
Coflexip is probably best known for the creation of high-pressure flexible
pipes, and CSO has an extremely dominant market position in the market for
flexible pipes and umbilcals (75 per cent). As a comparison, Stolt Offshore
has a market position of 5 per cent and Hallburton of 20 per cent. 49
Net operating revenue in 1999 was approximately EUR 1 bilion. Although
the share is declining, nearly one half of CSO's revenue stems from the North
Sea and their primary client base is made up of US majors.50 CSO has a world-
wide frame agreement with Chevron for flexible flowlines. Its headquarter is
in Paris.
Coflexip acquired Stena in 1994 and forrned Coflexip Stena Offshore, a
French company with headquarters in Paris. COS employs approximately
4,000 people spread over five continents, with subsidiaries in Angola,
Australia, Brazil, Canada, France, India, Norway, Singapore, the United
Kingdom and the United States.
After a sale of a 30 per cent stake in CSO by Stena to the French group
Technip, a world-wide strategic allance in offshore activities was established
in April 2000 between Technic and CSO. By this acquisition, Technip became
the largest shareowner in CSO. A joint bidding strategy for integrated projects
was formed. The reason for this was given to be the demands from c1ients
seeking a broader array of services from a limited number of suppliers.
Wheras CSO has a leading position in the deep offshore market ((4) and (5)
in Table 1), Technic brings additional competence in engineering and project
management capability (2); a broad geographic presence; and a more
diversified client base (national oil companies in particular). Technic is
primarily involved in downstream activities (oil refining and gas processing)
and has established an Angolan subsidiary seeking to establish a refinery in
Angola.
In their marketing, CSO therefore emphasises that the company is a world
leader and the most integrated contractor in the subsea oilfeld service
industry. CSO has als o recently entered into an agreement to acquire Aker
Maritime's deepwater division. Through the strategic allance with Technip
and the planned acquisition of the Deepwater Division, CSO has
complemented its activities downstream and also covers all stages in the
upstream value chain. CSO is thereby able to ten der for significantly higher
contracts.
The strategic objective behind the acquisition of Aker is explained as
"increasing the Group's front-end and full field engineering capabilties;
expanding and strengthening its geographic presence in deep water markets,
49 Figures are from a press release from Technip April 2000
50 Among other contracts, it manufactures all flexible risers in the Asgard field.
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particularly the Gulf of Mexico; and enlarging the scope of technologies,
services and products offered by the Group. The two groups have an excellent
fit as they complement one another strategically, technologically, and
geographically and have similar cultures." (CSO, Press Release, 29 Oct. 2000.)
Looking at the technology, CSO is particularly interested in Akers' Oeepwater
Oivision's advanced technologies in offshore production support, including
dry well-head concepts. The Oeepwater Division is one of the two companies
holding exclusive rights to the SP AR technology for driling and production in
deepwater. SPAR has become the leading concept for dry completion
deepwater field developments. The Deepwater Oivision has been involved in
all the three existent SP AR production platforms installed to date (in Mexico)
and CSO is seeking to tender the concept in other parts of the world as well.
The Oeepwater Division also holds astrong market position in the area of
engineering and construction of FPSOs, Tension Leg Platforms (TLPs) and
semi-submersible platforms.
4.3. Informal partnerships
Both ABB and CSO have a frame agreement with Chevron. Apart from this,
we do not find indications of any informal relationship between the parties.
Chevron has been operating in Angola since the 1950s and is the country's
largest oil producer. Half of Angola's oil is shipped to the US market. Chevron
hopes that a lot of their future spending in Angola wil go to US suppliers. The
US has even created financial guarantees for this purpose. 51 According to
Kenneth Derr, Chevron's chairman and CEO, "I would hope a lot ofthat
would go to U.S. suppliers. This Ex-1m bank loan wil certainly hel p and I
think it' s a great ste p forward ... in order to make US businesses more
competitive" (Alexander's Gas and Oil, December 24 1998).
In this context, we find it remarkable that contracts for suppliers are not
biased towards American companies. Neither financial incentives towards
American suppliers, nor preferences for American suppliers by Chevron as the
principle stakeholder, were enough to win contracts at the Kuito development
in block 14 for US companies.52 Only ABB and Sedco Forex are headquartered
in the US.
51 The Ex-1m Bank provides guarantees of working capitalloans for US exporters, guarantees
the repayment of loans, or makes loans to foreign purchasers of US goods and services. The
bank also provides credit insurance against non-payment by foreign buyers for political or
commercial risk. In the last year it financed approximately USD 40 milion in SSA. but it can
I?ive guarantees for USD 400 milion year iSSA.
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4.4 Similar findin9s and alternative explanations
Based on a transaction costs analysis of the organisation of the supply chain in
the British part of the North Sea, Hallwood found liUle support for the
transaction costs analysis (Hallwood, 1992).
In a study of Statoil's procurement by Dir. Trondslien (www.statoil.com), the
degree of integration was found to vary between different phases of
production and between different tasks in each phase. The suppliers'
contribution to total inputs amounted up to 95 per cent within driling/well
technology and the development projects (cf. stages 1:5 in Table 1), 50-70 per
cent within the operation (stage 6) of on- and offshore installations, up to 70
per cent within distribution/sales and approximately 50 per cent within
innovation (stage 2 in particular). It therefore seems that the oil companies are
vertically linked downstream, but not upstream. Several studies confirm this
results (Al Moneef 1998; Al Obaidan and Scully 1993; Bindemann 1999). Our
findings supports the hypothesis derived from the property right perspective
that contractors tend to be integrated oil service firms (see the conc1uding
section) .
However, the re are two main problems with empirical analyses based on
trans action costs (Shelanski and Klein 1999). First, there is the measurement
problem of comparing the value of the investments inside and outside a
relationship. Normally, survey methods where respondents are requested to
state their opinions on a Likert scale are applied for this purpose. Our
approach was to ask whether the supplier was afraid of imitation and hold-
ups. Second, and more importantly alternative hypotheses could in many cases
equally well confirm the data.
Two such alternative hypotheses giving the same predictions as the property
right approach are:
. Market power. Neo-classical approaches are based on market power
explanations or economics of scope between successive stages in order to
explain vertical integration (Stigler 1951). The mark et power explanation
of (vertical) integration says that gains wil increase by degree of supplier
market concentration (Spiler 1985). When upstream firms have market
power, vertical integration eliminates the divergence between the value of
the marginal product of the input and the marginal cost. On the other
hand, the downstream firm also has market power and this reduces the
gains from mergers. Assuming the downstream market power is the same
in Norway and Angola (most of the multinational oil companies are
located in both destinations), and that the supply industry is 'thinner' in
Angola than in Norway, a more integrated supply chain is likelier in
Angola than in Norway. Jf upstream market power stems from access to a
superior technology or other physical assets, e.g., a yard, ane should
accordingly expect i) the tendency of acquisiton to increase, and ii) that
the main contractors tend to integrate with upstream firms.
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. Domestie political reasons. The pressure for integration can come from the
state in order to create a geographically segmented chain.
We do not find much evidence to confirm the latter theory. The integrated
solution concept chosen was requested by the oil companies and adapted to
their needs. This falsifes the demand-driven explanation. Angola has no
preferences for a particular organisation of the supply chain although it has
preferences for the use of local firms. The market power explanation
represents an alternative explanation, which has not been falsified by our data.
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Conclusion
Our findings support the hypothesis derived from the property right
perspective (confer section 3.2.1):
. As measured by the number of awarded contracts, the supply chain is more
integrated in technically advanced markets such as Angola compared to the
North Sea. Few, but sizeable contract partners are involved in our case
studies. Tailor-made solutions in deepwater are generally more technically
advanced or complex and require integrated solutions. The oil companies
achieve such integration by using integrated oil service firms.
. As measured by the informal networks between the contract partners, the
importance of relational contracts based on mutual trust are less than in
the North Sea. Contracts are mainly based on market transactions between
the supply industry and the oil companies. For instance, we find no close
relationship between the oil company and the constructing firm. However,
Girasoll and Kuito display slightly different patterns. At Girasoll, main
contracts are awarded to firms sharing the nationalities of the majority
interests in the licence (French and Norwegian). We do not fin d similar
preferences for American firms in the Chevron case (at Kuito). Since oil
service firms are integrated units and relational contracts are harder to
sustain in Angola, the competition arena is biased more towards a
competition between integrated oil service firms rather than between
integrated supply chains (as in the North Sea).
. As measured by knowledge intensity, technically advanced tasks are
undertaken in-house while low-skil intensive tasks are fragmented (Le.,
construction activities and the building of ships are done by independent
companies) .
The 'glue' in the chain determines a firm's penetrating strategies regarding its
choice of market segment and types of relationships to the main actors in the
supply chain. When most transactions in the chain were based on arm's
length trade, upstream firms compete with regard to costs. To the extent that
the establishment of relationships to customers is important, one would
expect the supplier to get in touch with the oil companies, and especially the
operator, since they are the ultimate customer and organiser of the chain (as
in the North Sea). The flp side of the coin are projects in which the oil
company prefers an integrated approach (as the Angolan cases presente d) .
There are several reasons for this choice, but in essence, the oil company
prefers to deal with a limited number of suppliers in order to reduce
transaction costs, spread the risk, and concentrate on core activities. In an
integrated project, the main contractors are thereby more involved in the
organisation and design of the project. To serve as a main contractor, one
therefore needs to provide integrated solutions. Although first -tier suppliers
(e.g., big turnkey contractors) wil never succeed without a proven record or
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reputation vis-à-vis the oil company, second-tier suppliers and sub-suppliers
need to create relationships to first-tier suppliers (main contractors), not
primarily the oil companies.53 Without previous experience with multinational
contractors, this may create problems for the sub-suppliers (Crabtree, Bower,
and Keogh 1997). In both cases, a supplier not only needs to be competitive
in price but also needs a good business reputation. When the host
government, for instance the Angolan Government, requires or prefers that
foreign suppliers link up to local suppliers or oil companies, suppliers also
have to establish working relationships with local companies in the host
country.
Information about the glue in the chain is als o interesting for other reasons
than its impact on penetrating strategies. It determines whether liberalisation
of energy services wil have any effect on supply chain management.
Liberalisation may lead to standardisation and reduce the role of relationships,
particularly to the national oil company (confer (Wiig 2001)). The oil sector is
going through a rapid technological revolution, particularly in deepwater
technology and in B2B (Business to Business E-commerce) which may change
supply chain management. Previous business practices may therefore change
with the arrival of new players on the scene, either as providers of new
technology or as intermediates. These are questions to be addressed in
subsequent papers.
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Summary
This paper focuses on the organisation of the supply chain in
the offshore oil industry, primarily the relationships between
upstream oil-companies and their main contractors. From
studies of the North Sea offshore industry, we know that there
are c10se ties between the upstream oil industry and its suppli-
ers. From a transaction co st perspective, we analyse how the
supply chains are organised in new and promising markets such
as Angola where technology and trust differ from those of the
North Sea. Tailor-made solutions in deepwater are generally
more technically advanced and complex and require integrated
solutions. The oil companies in Angola achieve such integra-
tion by using integrated oil service firms. We also observe that
contracts are mainly based on market transactions between the
supply industry and the oil companies.
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